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Does Nuclear Energy Have a Future?
Moeed Yusuf
Abstract
Nuclear energy optimists suggest that a nuclear renaissance is under way. 
However, beyond such claims there is little objective analysis that corroborates 
the positive outlook. In fact, literature on nuclear energy is highly polarized, 
with much of the debate being situated within the ideological and normative 
realms. This paper moves away from the what should to the what is likely in 
order to present a realistic projection of the potential for the increased devel-
opment of nuclear energy over the next two to three decades. It examines the 
relative importance of the key determinant factors likely to affect the future 
of nuclear power in a cost-benefit framework. The factors examined include 
economic competitiveness, concern for climate change, safety and security issues 
related to nuclear technology, public perception about the energy source, and the 
quest for energy security. This analysis suggests that nuclear energy is likely to 
remain economically uncompetitive and investment-starved over the projected 
period. Public perceptions, both in the developed and developing world, are also 
likely to become increasingly wary. Measures required to improve the popular 
 sentiment–better safety and security–would increase costs substantially without 
guaranteeing positive transformation in the outlook. This is especially true as the 
proliferation risks present a virtually insurmountable barrier. These impediments 
would overshadow nuclear power’s merit in terms of carbon emission reductions 
as well as its partial attractiveness in terms of reducing energy vulnerability of 
countries. 
The author wishes to thank Adil Najam, Cutler Cleveland, Miquel Muñoz, and Subrata 
Ghoshroy for their comments, Cynthia Barakatt for editing support, and the Pardee Center 
for managing the publication process.
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I.  INTRoDucTIoN
The dream of making the 21st century the most economically successful in 
human history hinges on a number of supply-side concerns. One essential 
prerequisite to attaining this feat is availability of sustainable energy sources. 
The challenge is to ensure adequate supply of energy while limiting the 
negative implications of energy production. Today, 86 percent of global 
energy consumption is fulfilled by fossil fuels. This is worrisome due to ris-
ing costs of fossil-based sources, the ‘peak oil’ concerns that signal the likely 
dwindling of supplies in the coming decades, as well as the global warming 
effects linked to the use of fossil fuels. With supply concerns and as much 
as 75 percent of the anthropogenic carbon dioxide, a key agent of climate 
change, linked to the burning of coal, gas, and oil,1 there seems to be a 
growing convergence of the view that the future lies in moving away from 
carbon-based energy sources. This has invigorated interest in the non-car-
bon alternatives; it is this backdrop in which the so-called ‘nuclear renais-
sance’ is said to be taking place. 
Nuclear power is one of the few 
commercially tested sources of 
energy that is virtually free of 
greenhouse gas emissions. This 
automatically makes it of inter-
est to climate change pundits. 
Yet, the future of nuclear power 
is far from settled. In fact, few 
other subjects can boast of having 
literature that is as divided as the one on the future of nuclear energy. Not-
withstanding some noteworthy exceptions, views are largely ideological and 
range from unconditional support to normative perspectives that are equally 
deterministic in their opposition.2 
This paper moves away from the normative arguments. We seek to examine 
not what should happen, but what is likely to happen given the global con-
text that is expected to prevail over the next two to three decades. The ques-
tion is important as it provides policymakers—who have thus far been fed 
Nuclear power is one of the few com-
mercially tested sources of energy 
that is virtually free of greenhouse 
gas emissions. This automatically 
makes it of interest to climate change 
pundits. Yet, the future of nuclear 
power is far from settled. 
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with normative arguments—a reality check in terms of what is truly possible 
over the projected time period. In order to present a balanced picture, we 
examine factors that the literature suggests are likely to determine the future 
of nuclear energy. These include economic competitiveness, concern for cli-
mate change, safety and security issues related to nuclear technology, public 
perception about the energy source, and the quest for energy security. The 
relative importance of each of these and the interplay among them is ana-
lyzed to indicate the overall prospects for a nuclear renaissance. The analysis 
suggests that nuclear energy is likely to remain economically uncompetitive 
and investment-starved over the projected period. Public perceptions, in 
both the developed and developing world, are also likely to become increas-
ingly wary. Measures required to improve the popular sentiment—better 
safety and security—would increase costs substantially without guarantee-
ing positive transformation in the outlook. This is especially true as the 
proliferation risks present a virtually insurmountable barrier. These impedi-
ments would overshadow nuclear power’s merit in terms of carbon emission 
reductions as well as its attractiveness in reducing energy vulnerability of 
countries.  
This paper begins by presenting the existing projections regarding the future 
of nuclear energy. Section III discusses nuclear power’s economic competi-
tiveness as compared to alternative sources, the impact of nuclear power 
expansion on climate change, the safety concerns related to the spread of 
the energy source, the proliferation risks involved, the link between safety 
and security and the public perception about the use of nuclear power, and 
issues relating to energy security. Section IV summarizes the future outlook 
and recommends means to optimize the projected scenario. 
II.  IS The ReNAISSANce ReAl?
Since U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower introduced the ‘Atoms for 
Peace’ vision in 1953, nuclear energy has had a mixed experience.3 A eu-
phoric reception to Eisenhower’s idea saw aggressive growth of the nuclear 
industry early on. By 1970 as many as 90 nuclear plants with a capacity 
of 16,500 Megawatt-electric (MWe) were operational in 15 countries; by 
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1980, the figure had jumped to 253 plants with a capacity of 135,000 MWe 
spread across 22 countries.4 Although the number of plants continued to 
grow steadily until 1985, this time frame reflected the long lead times in 
plant construction. In reality, for a host of reasons—slower than expected 
economic growth and consequent reduction in electricity demand, rise in 
price of nuclear energy, inefficiencies within the nuclear industry, and ac-
cidents at nuclear plants—the period from the mid-1970s onwards saw a 
steep decline in the demand for nuclear energy.5 During the 1990s, there 
was an overall increase of merely 19 nuclear plants and that, too, was cour-
tesy of a positive trend in Asia.6 In the West, nuclear energy was viewed as 
approaching oblivion by the late-1990s.7 
While the rate of nuclear expansion has been no greater since the turn of 
the century, some of the world’s major economies like the U.S., China, and 
India, among others, have revived a focus on the nuclear option by floating 
energy plans that envision accelerated growth in nuclear capacity. Nuclear 
energy optimists view this as the beginning of a potential renaissance. They 
also take heart from the fact that overall global primary energy demand is 
expected to increase by 55 percent by 2030.8 Within the energy sector, elec-
tricity generation—the only aspect towards which nuclear energy is ready to 
contribute for the better part of this century—will increase from the current 
16,930 Terawatt-hour (TW-h) to 38,191 TW-h by 2030.9 Those who are 
hopeful see compelling reasons why nuclear energy should experience a cor-
responding increase in usage.
Today, there are 439 power plants with a combined gigawatt electric (Gwe) 
capacity of 372 spread across 31 countries.10 Moreover, 36 plants are under 
construction and another 93 are planned.11 Nuclear energy contributes 16 
percent to global electricity generation and six percent to the world’s pri-
mary energy production.12 Most future projections are optimistic and have 
been revised upward since the 1990s. A summary of the most prominent 
projections is provided in Table 1.
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The projected increase in nuclear energy capacity is expected to be con-
centrated in a handful of countries. The hope of a renaissance is largely 
hinged on the world’s largest nuclear industry, the U.S., and to a lesser 
extent on Japan, South Korea, and Russia among the developed countries, 
and China and India from the 
developing world. Together, these 
six countries account for 25 of 
the 36 nuclear plants currently 
under construction; this makes 
up two-thirds of the generating 
capacity likely to come on line by 
2015.13 From within this group, 
China remains the most impor-
tant in terms of the industry’s 
future growth. Its long-term 
plans amount to approximately 
96 GWe of additional nuclear 
power, which is more than twice 
that of any other country.14 Apart from the frontrunners, the Middle East is 
expected to play a moderate role in the so-called renaissance. Finally, all but 
the few most optimistic estimates discount the role of Europe as peripheral. 
Overall then, the future seems to have pinned greater hopes on the develop-
ing world than was the case during the initial growth of the nuclear industry 
five decades ago.15
III.  WIll ReNAISSANce Become ReAlITy?
The ultimate outcome of the drive towards a nuclear renaissance will de-
pend on how factors correlated with the increase of nuclear energy capacity 
weigh relative to each other over the projected time frame. Some of them, 
namely economic competitiveness, global warming concerns, public percep-
tions, and energy security considerations, are common to all energy sources. 
However, nuclear power also carries unique attributes such as high safety 
and proliferation risks that are certain to impact its growth trajectory in the 
coming years. In the following pages, we examine each of these concerns to 
determine just how they are likely to affect the future of nuclear power. 
The hope of a renaissance is largely 
hinged on the world’s largest nuclear 
industry, the U.S., and to a lesser ex-
tent on Japan, South Korea, and Russia 
among the developed countries, and 
China and India from the developing 
world. Together, these six countries 
account for  of the  nuclear plants 
currently under construction; this 
makes up two-thirds of the generating 
capacity likely to come on line by 0.
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economic competitiveness 
The foremost prerequisite for a renaissance is the nuclear industry’s eco-
nomic competitiveness vis-à-vis the alternatives. Nuclear power’s principal 
competitors in electricity generation over the projected period will be two 
fossil fuels, coal and natural gas. These fuels dominate today’s electricity 
market with a combined share of 60 percent and will likely retain their 
preeminence irrespective of the growth trajectory nuclear energy follows.16 
Yet, any gains that nuclear energy makes will essentially be at the expense 
of coal or gas. Despite receiving significant policy support from a number 
of Western governments, ‘new’ renewable energy sources—these consti-
tute wind and solar energy—are not likely to be major determinants of the 
global energy mix over the projected period.17 Currently, wind and solar 
account for only two percent of the world’s energy; latest estimates suggest 
a meager growth rate of 2.1 percent per year until 2030.18 Even studies that 
take a normative stance on the need to expand renewable energy admit that 
substantial technological progress is required before these energy sources can 
capture a significant share of the market.19 Therefore, we limit the following 
comparison of economic competitiveness to nuclear and fossil fuel-based 
energy. 
The cost structure of nuclear energy production is much different than that 
for fossil-based alternatives. Among overall energy production expenses—
these include capital and marginal costs20—expenses for the nuclear option 
are heavily skewed towards capital costs while coal and gas entail a much 
heavier burden of marginal costs. Therefore, any meaningful comparison 
between the two ought to be conducted for baseload operation. The most 
systematic attempt to do so has been undertaken by the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology (MIT)’s study, “The Future of Nuclear Power.” Com-
paring levelized plant lifetime costs21 in the U.S., the study determines that 
nuclear power remains substantially more expensive than pulverized coal 
and Combined-Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) options. Nuclear energy does 
not acquire a cost advantage even after considering a steady rise in future gas 
prices and far-fetched assumptions entailing a 25 percent decrease in nuclear 
plant construction costs, a decrease by the same proportion in operation and 
management costs (this would mean perfect operations), and a shortened, 
Does Nuclear Energy Have a Future?    
four-year construction period for nuclear power plants. Only after an even 
more farfetched assumption that equates nuclear financing costs with those 
for coal and gas plants is introduced does the nuclear option become com-
petitive with CCGT; however, it is still unable to match coal.22 
Table 2: costs of Alternatives to Nuclear electricity Generation 
(Real levelized costs in cents/kWe-hr at 85 percent capacity factor)
Base case
25-year 40-year
Nuclear 7.0 6.7
Coal 4.4 4.2
Gas (low price) 3.8 3.8
Gas (moderate price) 4.1 4.1
Gas (high price) 5.3 5.6
Gas (high price)—advanced CCGT design 4.9 5.1
Reduced Nuclear Cost Scenarios
Reduced construction cost by 25 percent 5.8 5.5
Reduced construction time by 1 year 5.6 5.3
Cost of capital brought down to coal and gas level 4.7 4.4
Source: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Future of Nuclear Power,” 2003, 
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/ (accessed on June 4, 2005), p.52. 
Latest estimates concur with the MIT study’s findings. The Keystone report 
(2007) estimates levelized lifetime costs for nuclear power at 8.3 to 11.1 
cents per Kilowatt-hour (kWh), a figure even higher than that estimated by 
the MIT study.23 In order to become competitive, Exelon, the U.S.’ largest 
nuclear energy operator, estimates that the overnight costs for nuclear plants 
would have to decline to $1,000–1,200/kilowatt (kW) from the current 
$3,600–4,000/kW.24 Even the most optimistic voices do not envision such a 
dramatic reduction in the foreseeable future. 
The story is much the same in the other countries deemed to be at the 
forefront of the nuclear renaissance dream. In China and India, total expendi-
tures on gas and coal plants tend to be between 30 and 60 percent of nuclear 
plant costs, a differential that provides the former with a cost advantage.25 For 
India, M.V. Ramana calculates a cost advantage for thermal power for any real 
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discount rate above 3.9 percent for new reactors and 2.7 percent for currently 
operating units.26 Similarly, official Russian estimates point to a figure of less 
than $1,000/kW for nuclear plant construction costs if nuclear energy is to 
remain competitive. However, actual costs are much higher; for example, the 
ongoing construction of the AES-600 plant containing a third generation reac-
tor is expected to cost $2,100/kW.27 While the picture is not as clearly negative 
for Japan—this owes to the limited indigenous supply and high cost of alterna-
tives—even there high-end estimates suggest that nuclear power’s current mar-
ket competitiveness is only due to the 1.38 cents/kWh subsidy provided by the 
state.28 Indeed, the economic scenario is truly favorable only in a few European 
countries and in Canada.29 However, slowing growth in energy demand is not 
likely to make these states relevant to the renaissance dream. 
The above-mentioned cost comparisons do not present the full picture of 
the differentials. There are a number of additional costs that are not in-
ternalized in such basic calculations but still remain pertinent to the fu-
ture increase of nuclear energy 
capacity. One serious concern is 
investment-uncertainty. Nuclear 
energy’s upfront capital costs 
and longer plant construction 
timeframes make it highly sensi-
tive to interest rates.30 This is 
problematic since the history of 
nuclear power plants is notorious 
for huge cost overruns, substan-
tial delays in construction, high 
procedural hurdles, and extreme 
uncertainty about political ac-
ceptability of nuclear power over time.31 These factors played a major role in 
bringing about the slump in the Western nuclear industry during the 1980s; 
energy sector investors preferred more predictable, short-term, less capital-
intensive investments.32
Even today, from the investors’ perspective, the nuclear industry presents 
a higher-risk proposition than fossil fuels; its risk-adjusted cost, the chief 
Nuclear energy’s upfront capital costs 
and longer plant construction time-
frames make it highly sensitive to 
interest rates. This is problematic since 
the history of nuclear power plants 
is notorious for huge cost overruns, 
substantial delays in construction, high 
procedural hurdles, and extreme un-
certainty about political acceptability 
of nuclear power over time.
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benchmark for investment decisions, is seldom lower than that for the alter-
natives.33 Notwithstanding claims by proponents that investor interest in the 
industry has revived and that procedural impediments have been lowered in 
the West, the fact is that cost and construction time overruns have persisted 
even in the most recent experiences.34 Moreover, despite the fact that hefty 
investment stimuli—the U.S. government, for example, has accorded a $2 
billion subsidy and investor guarantees to the nuclear industry—have gener-
ated some interest, there is yet to be an actual commitment for purchase of 
a new nuclear plant in countries like the U.S.35 In fact, credit raters such 
as Standard and Poor’s argue that “from a credit perspective, provisions 
may not be substantial enough to sustain credit quality and make [nuclear 
energy] a practical strategy.”36 
As nuclear energy expands to the developing world, the problem of invest-
ment-uncertainty is likely to intensify as the relatively new entrants to the 
nuclear energy club pass through their own learning curves. In India’s case, 
for example, the country’s 10 major nuclear reactors have had cumulative 
cost overruns of over 300 percent; against an estimated cost of approxi-
mately $5.2 billion, revised costs were $17.7 billion.37 This is when every 
additional $500 per Kilowatt-electric (kWe) capacity in overnight capital 
costs ends up raising electricity cost by 1.5 cents/kWh in the developing 
world.38 Moreover, efficiency levels of nuclear plants are generally lower in 
developing countries and consequently operation and management costs 
could reasonably be expected to exceed even liberal Western estimates. Not 
to mention, political uncertainty and policy reversals are also major worries 
for investors eyeing nuclear industries in the global South.39 Perhaps a reflec-
tion of this sentiment, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) already charges a one percent additional interest on 
the loans it provides against exports of nuclear power plants.40 
The developing world is also unlikely to be able to benefit from its theoreti-
cal advantage of having tightly regulated energy industries. The argument 
is that states could conceivably provide fuel buy-back guarantees and offer 
higher-than-market returns on capital to offset some of the investment risk. 
However, in reality, for most developing countries, this will be an unbear-
able resource drain. Their resource crunches imply that such privileges 
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would compete with other development needs.41 While thus far countries 
like Russia, China, and India have funded the expansion of the nuclear sec-
tor through public allocations or deferred loan payments to exporting states, 
perhaps in a bid to prove the sector’s worth to investors, their resource con-
straints and the market imperfections caused by continuous state interven-
tion in the energy sector are already prompting them to privatize sections of 
the energy industry. Both India and Russia plan to have substantially priva-
tized energy sectors by 2020.42 In fact, none of the nuclear frontrunners 
will be able to come close to their nuclear energy expansion targets without 
enormous private sector investment in the coming years. Deregulation then 
will force states to pass on the investment risks completely to the investors. 
This will remove any artificially created competitiveness for nuclear energy; 
the investors’ risk-adjusted cost for the industry will thus be substantially 
higher than any strict cost-accounting exercise would suggest.
The high-risk investment demand of the nuclear industry creates a chicken-
and-egg problem for nuclear enthusiasts. While they may rightly contend 
that nuclear plants have enhanced their capacity factors across the world 
and that newer designs for smaller and even more efficient plants could put 
nuclear energy at an advantage over the long run, even for these promises to 
be demonstrated, massive commercial nuclear expansion is required.43 This 
demands ex ante investment; however, investors will not be forthcoming 
because of the poor legacy of the nuclear industry and the aforementioned 
investment risks in the developing world unless competitiveness is demon-
strated on a large scale and over a prolonged period in advance. In essence 
then, as aptly summed up by Cochran: “….the bottom line is that in the 
current economic climate, commercial nuclear generation is not even close 
to being competitive with fossil-fueled plants and there is no easy path to a 
competitive market for new nuclear plants.”44
Nuclear energy’s Impact on climate change
The strongest push for nuclear energy is emanating from the climate change 
lobby that sees global warming as the 21st century’s most formidable chal-
lenge. It is this cohort that is responsible for much of the ‘positive deter-
minism’ regarding nuclear energy’s future outlook. The impetus to this 
normative view is provided by the growing consensus on the urgency to 
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tackle climate change; a number of recent reports have emphasized the need 
for immediate and drastic reductions in carbon emissions.45 In order to sta-
bilize the atmospheric quantity of carbon dioxide at 500 parts per million, 
global emissions must be reduced by 50 percent by mid-century.46 Given the 
taxing nature of fossil fuels vis-à-vis carbon levels, should the current energy 
policies remain unaltered, baseline greenhouse gas emissions will increase by 
9.7 to 36.7 Gigatons (Gt) of carbon dioxide equivalent between 2000 and 
2030.47 This implies a 40 to 110 percent increase in carbon dioxide emis-
sions from energy use.48 
Although not explicitly stated under the Kyoto Protocol as a source against 
which countries can obtain credits, nuclear energy is a non-carbon-emitting 
source.49 The entire nuclear production chain contributes between 10 and 
25 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kWh, which is approximately 20 
to 60 times less than fossil fuel chains.50 The International Panel on Fissile 
Material’s “Global Fissile Report 2007” estimates that an installed nuclear 
capacity of 1072 GWe (an addition of 700 GWe to the current level) 
instead of an equivalent additional capacity for modern high-efficiency coal-
electric plants would reduce projected emissions by 1 billion tons of carbon 
(tC) per year.51 Nuclear Energy Agency puts the emissions savings from 
an additional 748 GWe at 200 Gt by 2050.52 Even today, nuclear energy 
reduces the energy sector’s contribution to atmospheric carbon dioxide by 
eight percent assuming that it substitutes fossil fuel units; this amounts to 
600 million tC annually, twice as much as the Kyoto Protocol is expected to 
save by 2010, according to IAEA estimates.53 
On the climate change count then, nuclear energy’s merit is indisputable. 
The often-heard argument that even the most optimistic projections for the 
increase of nuclear energy would only reduce global carbon emissions by 
a small proportion is misplaced.54 The frame of reference ought not to be 
relative; the actual benefit is the reduction in overall emissions, no matter 
how small, which would otherwise be foregone. In the same vein, those 
who argue for diverting expenditures towards improving efficiency of fossil 
fuels or exploring other technologies instead exaggerate the potential carbon 
emission savings from such a move. Efficiency gains are not likely  
to reduce emissions by more than 30 percent at most.55 Nordhaus and 
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Shellenberger argue that in the U.S., efficiency, conservation, and a $50 per 
ton carbon surcharge combined will only bring about a 22.5 percent reduc-
tion in emissions.56 Moreover, carbon capture and storage options are still to 
be demonstrated on a wide scale and the geological storage space available 
for carbon dioxide remains a matter of some debate.57 The point is not to 
say that efficiency gains should not be pursued—indeed, they are an im-
perative in their own right—but simply to suggest that they should not be 
looked at as perfect substitutes for the carbon emissions-reduction benefits 
of nuclear power. 
The above said, however, the future of nuclear power cannot be judged 
strictly through the narrow confines of the climate change prism since the 
attraction in terms of carbon emissions reduction alone will not be suffi-
cient to allow for a rapid deployment of nuclear technology. While climate 
change has indeed become a 
salient issue in the developed 
world—industrialized countries 
are bound to reduce their emis-
sions to five percent below the 
1990 levels under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol—few are moving to curb 
emissions as swiftly as required.58 
Moreover, even those who see 
non-carbon-emitting sources as 
the only long-term solution to 
climate change retain disproportionate focus on renewables like wind and 
solar energy. This is despite their cost-ineffectiveness and the uncertainty 
surrounding their actual capacity. The bias against nuclear energy points to 
the comparatively greater importance the Western world pays to the safety 
and security implications of nuclear energy (we discuss these in the next 
two sections). Europe has been adamant about keeping nuclear energy off 
the global climate change negotiation agenda. Given its weight in interna-
tional politics and the extreme negative outlook towards nuclear power in 
much of the continent, Europe’s stance is not likely to change in the near 
The bias against nuclear energy points 
to the comparatively greater impor-
tance the Western world pays to the 
safety and security implications of 
nuclear energy. Europe has been ada-
mant about keeping nuclear energy off 
the global climate change negotiation 
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term. Moreover, even the U.S., while having renewed its interest in nuclear 
technology, has retained a bias towards renewable sources. In addition to 
offering greater benefits to new renewable energy sources through domestic 
policy, the U.S.’ official stance in climate change negotiations has continued 
to focus on renewables, efficiency enhancement, and carbon capture and 
sequestration options.59  
Next, despite a global drive towards penalizing high-carbon-emitting 
sources, nuclear energy’s positive attributes with regard to global warming 
will not make it economically competitive. There are existing proposals that 
aim at encouraging non-carbon-emitting sources by internalizing societal 
costs of emissions. The most prominent is the option of a carbon emissions 
tax on fossil fuels; Sweden, Finland, England, and New Zealand have al-
ready instituted a carbon tax in different forms.60 However, the level of taxes 
required to induce competitiveness for clean sources is extremely high. In 
the U.S., a $200/tC tax is believed to be adequate to induce a large enough 
shift away from fossil fuel-generated electricity such that atmospheric car-
bon concentrations will stabilize.61 According to the earlier-mentioned MIT 
study, this is also the tax rate at which nuclear energy becomes decisively 
competitive with coal and gas, presuming lowered per unit costs for con-
struction and capital for nuclear energy.62 However, since such a tax would 
increase the price of coal and gas-generated energy by a factor of seven and 
1.6, respectively, a decision to impose this hefty surcharge is likely to remain 
politically untenable.63 In the U.S., proposals currently under discussion 
are contemplating a tax below $50/tC.64 Similarly, Japan recently proposed 
a carbon tax amounting to a mere $20.85/tC.65 Even this move has been 
politically unpopular and has forced the government to delay the actual 
implementation of the levy. Naturally, the prospects are dimmer in the 
developing world, where even a debate to tax the energy sector so heavily 
is inconceivable for the most part.66 Having clearly stated their unwilling-
ness to accept any environmental binds that undermine their economic and 
social growth objectives, China and India are beginning to speak the climate 
change language. But even if they were to introduce such taxes, the amounts 
will not be anywhere near the $50/tC level, let alone $200/tC.67 
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unique Safety Requirements
Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear technology presents unique safety requirements, 
a breach in which can have drastic consequences for humans as well as the 
environment. While each stage of the nuclear-fuel cycle presents a risk in 
varying degrees, we focus on the two key stages: reactor core functioning 
and waste disposal requirements.  
Reactor core damage in nuclear power plants can cause catastrophic conse-
quences for people within the impact radius. The world’s two most deadly 
nuclear accidents, the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 and Chernobyl in 
1986—the latter affected a total of nine million people and 155,000 square 
kilometers of land—were caused by reactor core damage.68 Moreover, over 
300 minor-to-moderate nuclear accidents were recorded in the global nu-
clear industry by the mid-1990s.69 Further, despite claims of improvement, 
accidents have continued over the last decade. The most severe nuclear 
incident after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl took place at Tokaimura in 
Japan in 1999 when a massive uranium leak pushed atmospheric radiation 
levels up by a factor of 10,000 to 20,000.70 Among the renaissance front-
runners, accidents have been reported in the U.S. and India since 2000.71 
The probability of a mishap would rise astronomically if the nuclear renais-
sance was to materialize. According to the MIT study, with a much higher 
number of nuclear reactors, the probability of reactor core damage given the 
current Light Water Reactor (LWR) Technology will remain unacceptably 
high.72 Moreover, alternatives like the ‘advanced LWRs’ are still unproven in 
their safety record and other fresh technologies like the High-Temperature 
Gas Reactors with passive safety features and Generation IV reactors are 
some time away from maturing.73 
The second potential danger comes from the spent fuel at the back end of the 
reactor. The nuclear-fuel cycle discharges waste that remains radioactive over 
thousands of years.74 Reprocessing plants used to recycle spent fuel release 
‘high level’ waste that presents a different and even more dangerous proposi-
tion.75 Any release of radioactive material—this can occur due to the slightest 
negligence—could cause either a slow leakage into the air or water or a sud-
den burst resulting in widespread human and environmental damage.76 
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A successful demonstration of im-
proved safety will not take away the 
fact that ultimately the fate of the 
entire industry depends on one major 
accident; the catastrophic propor-
tion of this potential event trumps all 
claims pointing to the extremely low 
probability of its occurrence.
Elaborate waste disposal requirements add another dimension to the safety 
debate. While interim disposal steps such as temporary storage and trans-
port also exacerbate safety hazards, the real danger emanates from the ab-
sence of any permanent solution to the problem of ‘final’ disposal of reactor 
and reprocessed waste.77 The most scientifically promising avenue today is 
to store nuclear waste in deep geological repositories that entail dump mines 
several meters below the earth’s surface at geologically suitable locations.78 
However, there is still no fully functional repository and it is not even clear 
if all sites can handle spent fuel and reprocessed waste equally efficiently.79 
Under a high-end nuclear renaissance scenario, one large repository of 
roughly 70,000 Metric tons (MT) capacity will be required somewhere in 
the world every 3–4 years to cater to the 20,000 MT of spent fuel discharge 
per year.80 Both the requirement of suitable land and the sheer volume of 
high-level waste are alarming and cannot realistically be matched even by 
aggressive capacity upgrades in the next two to three decades.81 
The absence of positive empirical evidence on the safety count presents the 
same chicken-and-egg dilemma discussed earlier. Investors are unlikely to be 
forthcoming unless the nuclear 
industry gains acceptability as a 
safe source in state policies and 
the public perception at large. 
Yet, unless investment in com-
mercial plants is coupled with 
improved interim storage pro-
tocols and development of new 
final disposal sites on a reasonable 
scale, the existing safety track 
record cannot be reversed. In fact, 
on the safety front, the conundrum is even more complex. This is so since a 
successful demonstration of improved safety will not take away the fact that 
ultimately the fate of the entire industry depends on one major accident; the 
catastrophic proportion of this potential event trumps all claims pointing to 
the extremely low probability of its occurrence.82 From the investor’s point 
of view, it is not an actual accident but simply the prospect of such a devel-
opment that will cause averseness to the nuclear energy sector. And for the 
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investors that do enter the market, it is only natural to expect them to demand 
a high-risk premium.83 This is especially true for developing countries where 
safety cultures are weak and implementation of safety protocols is believed 
to be lax.84 The attendant cost implications are obvious. 
The Risk of  Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 
Intrinsically linked to the concerns about nuclear accidents are the chill-
ing prospects of nuclear weapons proliferation that the spread of nuclear 
technology and material inherently bring with them. The current outlook 
towards the threat of proliferation makes this the most intractable impedi-
ment, one that could by itself stall any prospects of a nuclear renaissance. 
As with accidents, each stage of the nuclear-fuel cycle presents proliferation 
risks. To begin with, nuclear fuel is highly susceptible. Uranium known 
as “yellow cake”—the input for a nuclear reactor—can be enriched to 
weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Under a scenario where 
nuclear power capacity grows roughly by a factor of four, the uranium en-
richment demand would jump from the current 44 million Separative Work 
Units (SWU)/year to 225 million SWU/year; this would necessitate a sub-
stantial increase in enrichment plants around the world.85 While uranium-
enrichment technology is extremely sophisticated, Pakistan, North Korea, 
and Iran’s experience has shown that developing countries with otherwise 
weak technological grounding can manage to attain enrichment capacity 
even against all odds. 
More so than uranium, however, the nuclear fuel from reprocessing plants 
employed in ‘closed’ nuclear fuel cycles provides a relatively easier route 
to nuclear weapons development.86 The prevalent reprocessing technol-
ogy that separates plutonium from spent fuel—PUREX—and recycles it 
in mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) allows the plutonium to be used directly for 
weapons manufacture.87 The technology to do so is elementary and is well 
understood.88 Further, even if the full fuel-cycle operations are not avail-
able to a particular country or non-state actor, the ever-increasing amount 
of weapon-usable plutonium stocks in the world can be siphoned away and 
used to manufacture weapons with moderate difficulty. Already, the global 
capacity to deal with excess plutonium stockpiles is found wanting. For 
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instance, the scientific community has been raising persistent alarms about 
the ease with which Russian fissile material stockpiles could be diverted.89 
Finally, the transport of nuclear fuel also raises proliferation risks. As put 
by Chaim Braun: “as the global nuclear energy system increases in size and 
diversity, and as nuclear fuel recycling evolves, the number of international 
fuel shipments over land, by air, or by ship will increase, thus increasing 
the temptation for diversion along the transport routes. Even more worri-
some is the eventual commercialization of FRs [fast reactors] and associated 
fuel reprocessing and refabrication facilities . . . . the plutonium contained 
in MOX fuel may be directly usable in weapons if successfully diverted and 
separated.”90
Table 3: current Global Stocks of Weapons usable Fissile material (metric tons)
Category Separated Plutonium HEU** Total
Bomb 
Equivalent***
Civil 
stocks* 229.5 437.5 667 46,187.5
Military 260.1 958.4 1,218.5 70,848.5
Total 489.6 1,395.9 1,885.5 117,036
Bomb 
equivalent 61,200 55,836 117,036
Note: The estimates for HEU have an error range of +/- 300 due to uncertainty about Rus-
sian uranium stockpile.
* For HEU, civil stocks include excess uranium for blend-down.
** Estimates exclude 328 MT of fresh and irradiated HEU possessed by U.S. and Russia for 
naval use.
*** To calculate bomb equivalent, the official IAEA benchmark of 25 kg of HEU and 8 kg of 
Plutonium for each warhead has been used.
Source: International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Material Report 2007,” 2008, 
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf (accessed on June 2, 2008).
Nuclear proliferation is now widely believed to be the world’s most com-
plex security challenge. Moreover, the non-proliferation debate is increas-
ingly shifting from its traditional emphasis on international safeguards and 
verification—there is now a consensus that these are mere stop-gap arrange-
ments91—to blaming the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) provision that 
allows signatory states to develop indigenous nuclear-fuel cycles and grants 
them the right to access civil nuclear technology. The current sentiment is 
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that as long as the NPT allows countries access to civilian technology, mili-
tary spin-offs will be inevitable. American strategic expert Joseph Cirincione 
argues that supply of sensitive nuclear materials for civilian purposes puts 
aspiring states a “screwdriver’s turn” away from converting it into a weapons 
capability.92 What is more, the concern is no longer limited to states. Non-
state actors, with their threat of conducting nuclear terrorism, are now at 
the forefront of the debate as well.93 
The prospects for a universally acceptable solution to the proliferation prob-
lem remain bleak. The problem is that on one hand, the non-proliferation 
world is convinced that any move to reshape the NPT will risk unraveling 
the entire regime; there is a virtual consensus against attempting this.94 On 
the other hand, the current regime has been ineffective as those who chose 
to stay outside its purview or cheated the system managed to do so rather 
successfully.95 Moreover, diffusion of the requisite technology has convinced 
most that the pace of weapons acquisition will be faster in the future.96 
Remaining within the confines of the NPT, the option currently being 
exercised is to pick and choose countries that are considered ‘responsible’ 
enough to be privy to the nuclear exchange benefits while ‘suspect’ states (as 
defined by Western powers) are increasingly being denied the privileges in 
addition to being subjected to enhanced safeguard inspections by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA). For one, this defies the spirit 
of the NPT; the very basis for the non-nuclear powers’ acceptance of the 
treaty was the provision for civilian nuclear exchange.97 More importantly, 
it creates an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy and inevitably ends up increasing 
the determination of those outside the privileged club to pursue indigenous 
programs.98 Indeed, critics of the Bush administration’s foreign policy 
argue that the single most important take-home lesson for countries at the 
receiving end of coercive U.S. tactics is that to be safe, one needs nuclear 
weapons.99 
While there is a plethora of proposals that seek to redress the technology dif-
fusion-proliferation paradox, all end up creating a world of nuclear ‘haves’ 
versus ‘have nots’. Even the most promising recommendation—creating 
multilateral nuclear fuel supply and reprocessing hubs—would rob develop-
ing countries of an indigenous fuel-cycle and increase fuel acquisition costs 
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substantially.100 This, like any other dichotomous arrangement, will remain 
a non-starter. In a statement representative of the view prevalent in the 
much of the global South, a senior ambassador from a developing country 
aptly summed up the problem: “Any system that is not perceived to be fair 
and aimed at universal rights is bound to fail and risks unraveling the whole 
structure of non-proliferation . . . . Limitations on technological development 
will need to be universal, not just for some and not for others.”101
It is the realization of the impossibility of the task at hand that has led to the 
currently prevailing pessimism regarding the future of nuclear proliferation. 
Even the most optimistic views admit that technological buffers are unlikely 
to be sufficient to prevent proliferation.102 Notwithstanding, no matter 
how inadequate, tough supply-side safeguards are the only option available 
to the global non-proliferation sheriffs—read Western powers—for now. 
Therefore, they will continue to single out ‘suspect’ states to be subjected to 
perpetual monitoring while being denied Article IV rights.103 While this will 
allow the global North to retain control of the non-proliferation strategy, it 
will inevitably serve as further impetus to those at the receiving end to seek 
an indigenous weapons capability. Moreover, as resentment among the ex-
cluded group of countries grows, we may face the prospect of the unraveling 
of the entire NPT regime. Inevitably, the dream of nuclear energy expansion 
will be an obvious loser. 
Public Sentiment Towards the Nuclear Industry
The safety and proliferation concerns regarding nuclear energy go beyond 
state policies and international conventions. An equally important variable 
affecting the future of the en-
ergy source is the public outlook 
towards these risks. The impor-
tance of popular sentiment to the 
nuclear industry is well-estab-
lished. The outcry following the 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl 
accidents was a major factor that 
contributed to the industry’s slump in the 1980s. Today, while public opin-
ion varies from country to country—among other factors, this depends on 
The importance of popular sentiment 
to the nuclear industry is well- 
established. The outcry following  
the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl 
accidents was a major factor that  
contributed to the industry’s slump.
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historic experience of the nuclear industry, level of general awareness, and 
costs of various energy sources—an overarching generalization suggests that 
the majority remains wary of nuclear expansion. A global opinion survey 
commissioned by the IAEA in 2005 showed that while citizens are willing 
to allow currently operating plants to continue, safety and security concerns 
lead them to remain skeptical about initiating new plants.104 
The impact of negative sentiment on state policies is most obvious in the 
case of the European Union. Backed by the majority’s opposition, a number 
of countries are gradually moving away from nuclear power. A large number 
of European states do not have a nuclear program, are phasing out reac-
tors, or have decided not to build new ones.105 The preference for renewable 
energy in countries like Germany and Britain is also in large part a func-
tion of the adverse popular sentiment towards the nuclear industry.106 Even 
elsewhere, as in the case of Japan, the adverse outlook is extreme and has 
already caused the government to tone down its plans to expand reprocess-
ing capacity.107 The sentiment is just as averse in Russia;108 however, in this 
case the government seems to be pressing ahead with its industry expansion 
plans regardless. That said, among the nuclear frontrunners, the U.S., India, 
and South Korea do enjoy support for nuclear expansion.109  
While a global consensus among popular sentiment is hard to envision on 
the issue, as long as the safety and security concerns remain, no outright 
support for nuclear expansion can be expected. In fact, a number of future 
safety, proliferation, and nuclear terrorism-related developments may tilt 
the overall public opinion further into the negative. With regard to safety, 
the persistent problem with reactor accidents has already been mentioned. 
Moreover, a fresh development-country argument that is creating hurdles 
even in countries like the U.S. is that deregulation of nuclear energy markets 
provides too much leeway to the private sector, which has an interest in 
minimizing safety-related expenditures in order to maximize profits. The 
argument has gained credibility as U.S. nuclear operators have been found 
in breach of basic safety protocols in the recent past. For instance, a near-
catastrophe at an Ohio-based nuclear station was avoided in 2002 when a 
6-inch deep boric acid created-hole was exposed in a reactor vessel head at 
an extremely late stage. Both the plant operator and the U.S. Nuclear Regu-
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latory Commission, which is mandated to conduct inspections, remained 
unaware of the damage.110 
In the developing world, the situation is quite the opposite. Countries like 
India and China, where the nuclear industry is largely run at the behest of 
the public sector, currently take advantage of the lack of mass awareness 
regarding the potential hazards posed by the nuclear industry by ignoring 
stringent safety requirements.111 Under a high-expansion scenario, foreign 
investment may well alter the apathy of the public in this regard. For one, 
given the higher risk, investors would not be forthcoming in countries that 
employ lax safety protocols. A demand to improve the safety apparatus 
would be natural; it may also be reinforced by pressure from the investors’ 
home countries to associate only with ventures meeting established safety 
practices. The IAEA is already advocating an internationally agreed upon 
standard which will force all nuclear activities to meet stipulated safety re-
quirements. Such a drive would also inevitably bring the global anti-nuclear 
advocacy groups to the forefront as they prompt the public in developing 
countries to become more proactive in demanding transparency in the 
nuclear industry. 
The above development would be welcome from a safety perspective. It 
would also be necessary if the public—both home and host country senti-
ment—is to be convinced of the safe nature of the industry. Notwithstand-
ing, such an outcome will create a public support-economic competitiveness 
paradox. The revamped safety apparatus would likely entail developing 
comprehensive safety plans, building human capacity that specializes in 
nuclear plant management, identifying final disposal sites after thorough 
geological and seismic analysis, storing waste in uninhabited areas in the 
interim, and adopting advanced technologies less prone to accidents. 
Moreover, the bureaucratic procedures would become excessively complex, 
perhaps even more so than in the developed world, given lack of experience 
and the generally slow and often corrupt nature of developing country bu-
reaucracies. These ventures will further add to the cost differential between 
nuclear and fossil alternatives, leaving the former unattractive both to the 
investors and perhaps even to the developing country governments.112 The 
paradox should be obvious: investment in the nuclear industry is unlikely 
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to take off until public perception transforms for the better; however, the 
way to ensure the latter makes the cost of investment prohibitive in the first 
place. 
As for the risk associated with nuclear terrorism and proliferation, the 
sentiment is likely to remain equally wary. It is well-established that public 
concerns about these aspects have grown in recent years.113 As the 2005 
IAEA survey showed, a majority of the respondents considered the threat 
of a nuclear terrorist attack to be ‘high’ and the IAEA’s capability to check 
proliferation to be ‘ineffective.’114 The worry is not unfounded. Specifically 
in terms of nuclear terrorism, nuclear power plants have been singled out 
as one of the potential targets of terrorist outfits.115 In terms of prolifera-
tion, states on the wrong side of Western policy create unease. Given that 
negatively perceived countries like Pakistan are vying for a civilian nuclear 
deal with the U.S. and China and as many as 13 Middle Eastern states have 
expressed an interest in nuclear technology in the wake of the Iran crisis, 
it is difficult to envision a positive change in this perception.116 Indeed, a 
recent Pew Survey suggests that nuclear weapons proliferation is considered 
to be the single biggest danger in the Middle East.117  Tied to this is the 
fact that if Western powers insist on maintaining a dichotomous order with 
regard to civilian nuclear technology access, they will necessarily have to le-
gitimize their breach of the NPT by persistently reminding their citizens of 
the threat that the spread of nuclear technology poses in terms of weapons 
proliferation. By implication, this would reinforce the negative sentiment 
regarding the expansion of nuclear power among their populous. 
Another conundrum stems from the intrinsic link between transparency 
and positive public opinion. The nuclear industry suffers from a negative 
legacy, one that turned mass opinion decisively against it at the time of 
the first slump. As Yim and Vaganov argue, entities facing such a trust and 
confidence deficit require “nothing less than a new culture;” they stress the 
need for transparency and new and heavy investments in efforts to alter the 
popular perception.118 This is especially true for a sector where the reasons 
for the historic opposition to the industry have not disappeared. That said, 
however, under the kind of proliferation and terrorist threat presently faced 
by the nuclear industry, transparency runs counter to the industry’s security 
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compulsions. In fact, that the nuclear industry cannot operate on the basis 
of full disclosure is already taken to be a foregone conclusion; the current 
debate revolves around the extent to which information can be revealed.119 
Arguably, as the menace of proliferation and terrorism grows, safety and 
security demands will tend to drive the industry towards further opacity. 
Moreover, free-riding will become more common. Countries that may 
find elaborate transparency a costly exercise would tend to hide behind the 
‘doctrine of necessity’ to keep their operations out of the public eye. To add 
to the complexity, the growing influence of the ideologically driven anti-
nuclear advocacy lobby implies intensified efforts to expose every minute 
mishap in the industry. As Yim and Vaganov contend, this would create 
adverse behavioral reactions, an effect they attribute to the “predominance 
of negative aspect of all nuclear issues and due to the social amplification of 
risk.”120 
energy Security
As the global economy develops, the world’s finite energy sources will face 
increasing pressure. This is worrisome for growing economies as they require 
predictable and abundant sup-
plies of energy to retain growth 
momentum. Absence of the same 
can leave the country economi-
cally compromised and strategi-
cally vulnerable. Yet, with skewed 
global distribution of fossil fuels 
and prices projected to increase 
over the long run, some of the 
fastest developing countries are already finding their economies vulnerable 
to external disruptions. Interestingly, each of the countries at the forefront 
of the nuclear renaissance dream also harbors significant energy security 
concerns. 
Once again, China and India lie at the heart of the debate. Projected to 
account for 45 percent of the rise in global energy consumption by 2030, 
their dependence on foreign fossil fuel will grow commensurately.121 While 
Once again, China and India lie at 
the heart of the debate. Projected to 
account for  percent of the rise in 
global energy consumption by 00, 
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will grow commensurately.
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both have been engaged in aggressive attempts to diversify their traditionally 
narrow import sources for some time, geo-political overtones have resulted 
in painstakingly slow progress.122 This has strengthened their resolve to seek 
fresh domestic energy supply options in parallel. The situation is much the 
same in developed countries like Japan and South Korea. Lack of alternatives 
and vulnerability to global price shocks is a key reason for Japan to persist 
with its nuclear program despite public opposition. In the U.S., an astronomi-
cally high energy import bill—a trend predicted to grow—is behind calls for 
exploring additional domestic options.123  Even in Europe, for countries like 
Finland and Ukraine—both exceptions to the downward trend in nuclear 
energy growth in the continent—reducing vulnerability to Russian energy 
supplies is a high priority.124 
Nuclear energy compares favorably to fossil fuels in terms of enhancing energy 
security for states with full fuel-cycle facilities. Compared to fossil fuels, the 
input of the nuclear fuel cycle, uranium, is relatively democratically distrib-
uted and is in abundance. As many as 43 countries possess sizable uranium re-
serves.125 Estimates suggest that proven reserves extractable through currently 
available techniques will last 80 years.126 Next, nuclear energy benefits from a 
much higher energy density—this is a measure of the amount of fuel input re-
quired to produce a given amount of energy—than fossil-based alternatives.127 
For instance, the per annum concentrated uranium requirement for a 1,000 
MWe nuclear power plant is 25 tons as compared to 2,300,000 tons of coal 
for a coal-based plant.128 Therefore, uranium stocks lasting over long periods 
can be imported in one consignment. Currently, countries regularly using 
nuclear energy can store two to three years worth of uranium but the period 
can be extended should uranium supply concerns arise.129 Finally, while coal 
and natural gas constitute 45 and 70 percent of production costs for these two 
fossil fuels, respectively, uranium constitutes only 15 to 20 percent of the same 
at nuclear plants.130 According to Lauvergeon, even a 50 percent increase in 
uranium prices would result in a four percent tariff increase for nuclear energy 
as compared to 38 percent for coal or gas.131 
Nuclear power’s preferential position with regard to energy security explains 
why countries like China and India are adamant about following this path 
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despite the source’s lack of competitiveness, the heavy resource burden it will 
end up laying on states, and its excessive safety and security concerns. That 
said, the mere pursuit of energy security will not eliminate these impedi-
ments. For one, safety and proliferation concerns may well lead to deliberate 
tightening of uranium supplies some time in the future. Already, there are 
concerns about supplying uranium to non-NPT members like Pakistan and 
India. Although for now, India has managed to conclude bilateral deals for 
civil nuclear energy cooperation with the U.S., France, and Russia, these 
arrangements have been highly unpopular and had to face legal and moral 
hurdles.132 Pakistan’s requests for the same have been persistently denied.133 
Admittedly, while ‘likable’ countries may still find means to acquire neces-
sary fuel, the process will become increasingly unpredictable as nuclear 
power expands. The advantage of natural abundance of uranium would thus 
be artificially neutralized. To be sure, nuclear proponents could point to the 
fact that availability of uranium can be increased immensely by employing 
‘fast reactor’ reprocessing technology. Indeed, if the entire nuclear industry 
were to use fast reactors instead of the currently prevalent once-through fuel 
cycles, the presently extractable uranium can be made to last 3,000 years.134 
However, this view ignores the economic imperatives that would make such 
a move untenable. Recent estimates suggest that reprocessing raises costs of 
electricity production by a factor of 2.42.135 
High costs for the state and investor averseness will also take their toll on 
the quest for energy security. In fact, for most countries, costs may become 
unbearable at some point. This view gains credibility when one considers 
that irrespective of their determination to expand nuclear capacity, nuclear 
energy will account for a minority share in overall energy consumption of 
each of the frontrunners for the foreseeable future.136 This implies a lower 
than expected resource-drain threshold; if cost overruns and delays continue 
to make nuclear energy much more expensive than optimists promise, the 
cost-benefit equation would become unfavorable to nuclear energy despite 
taking energy security concerns into account. At that point, even the most 
determined states may refocus attention on alternatives. 
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IV.  coNcluSIoN: oPTImIzING The PRojecTeD NucleAR FuTuRe
The interplay of the determinant variables of the nuclear industry’s future 
seems to create a number of irreconcilable conundrums. Steps to tackle 
investor uncertainty end up raising the already unfavorable cost differential 
between nuclear power and its alternatives, thus prompting investors to shy 
away in the first place. Alleviat-
ing fears about nuclear safety 
requires additional costs (at least 
in the developing world) and 
successful demonstration. For 
one, costs make the investment 
unattractive. Moreover, investors 
prefer ex ante demonstration; that 
is impossible unless investment 
is forthcoming. Next, redress-
ing security concerns affords no 
obvious solution. However, the 
current drive towards the invest-
ment/demonstrated safety dichotomy is inherently contradictory to the goal 
of nuclear power expansion. It limits nuclear industries to select countries 
and deliberately emphasizes the dangers in the spread of nuclear technology. 
The outcome is self-defeating given the aim of transforming public opin-
ion positively. Moreover, transparency in the functioning of the industry, 
another prerequisite for altering popular perception, is mutually exclusive 
from robust security requirements given the current proliferation and terror-
ism threats. Finally, the high resource burden and current anti-proliferation 
strategies limit the utility of nuclear energy as a means of reducing energy 
vulnerability. In the final outcome, even the obvious merits of nuclear en-
ergy are overshadowed; a case in point is the climate change benefit, which 
is being discounted in favor of more costly renewable alternatives in much 
of the developed world. 
Looking ahead, the projected scenario ought to inform measures taken in 
the global energy sector in the coming years. This implies a move away from 
ideological debates towards a realization of the on-the-ground reality regard-
The high resource burden and current 
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reducing energy vulnerability. In the 
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ing the nuclear industry’s prospects. The analysis presented here points to 
a bleak picture with regard to the climate change agenda. Neither will the 
nuclear renaissance be strong enough, nor will renewables become avail-
able at the level required to stabilize atmospheric carbon. Therefore, in the 
interim, measures designed to enhance efficiency of fossil fuels and options 
such as carbon capture and sequestering ought to receive attention. 
Moreover, countries that see energy security as the chief concern and are 
thus adamant about taking the nuclear route will need to balance their 
developmental needs with the expenditure on nuclear energy over the long 
run. Developing countries like China and India seem to have based all 
projections on overly optimistic scenarios, ones that are unlikely to be real-
ized. Realistically, the renaissance frontrunners are only likely to reduce their 
energy vulnerability marginally over the long run despite intense efforts. 
Clearly then, the focus of initiatives aimed at enhancing energy security 
ought to be diverted to securing more credible and predictable traditional 
energy supplies. 
Next, given the magnitude of any potential nuclear incident, perhaps the 
most important concern remains with regard to safety and security in the 
nuclear industry. This is true irrespective of the future trajectory of nuclear 
power; safe and secure operations must be ensured wherever nuclear en-
ergy production, transport, or storage is taking place. The IAEA is already 
mandated to establish safety benchmarks, but the global practice varies from 
country to country.137 There is a need to apply these standards uniformly 
using the highest common denominator. Moreover, possibilities of allow-
ing the IAEA a mandate to ensure adequate physical protection of plants 
through bilateral or multilateral arrangements should be explored. 
Specifically with regard to the nuclear fuel cycle, reprocessing of spent fuel 
must be abandoned in favor of the once-through alternative. Apart from 
being cost-ineffective, reprocessing raises the likelihood of an accident, 
generates a larger number of waste streams, and makes proliferation easier. 
Further, even if reprocessing continues, the presently applied MOX fuel 
cycle must be upgraded or new, less dangerous technologies must be tried.138 
MOX is a highly susceptible option, both in terms of safety and security.  
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Simultaneously, efforts to strengthen the security protocol to ensure safe 
transport of nuclear fuel and waste will be needed. Although a legally 
binding convention for nuclear material in international transit exists, the 
current security arrangements will become inadequate even if nuclear energy 
grows moderately. The IAEA should consider revising its guidelines to 
develop a multilateral framework; it has already been talking about the need 
to do so. 
Finally, few options are available in terms of halting proliferation. The 
ultimate solution lies in addressing the demand-side incentives for countries 
to seek nuclear weapons. This, however, requires a revamping of geopoliti-
cal interests of global and regional powers, more equitable developmental 
opportunities for the global South, and resolution of long-standing disputes 
between countries, among other things. By any standard, this is a tall order; 
the non-proliferation agenda surely cannot wait for this to come about. The 
most realistic option for now is to further strengthen supply-side anti-pro-
liferation measures as well as the international safeguards regime. On that 
count, steps like the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, and tightening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines are wel-
come.139 However, these ought to be applied judiciously across the board. 
The 2006 World Energy Outlook stated: “Nuclear power will only become 
more important if the governments of countries where nuclear power is 
acceptable play a stronger role in facilitating private investment, especially 
in liberalized markets” and “if concerns about plant safety, nuclear waste 
disposal, and the risk of proliferation can be solved to the satisfaction of the 
public.”140 Our analysis suggests that this is unlikely to happen. Granted, 
China, India, U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Russia may remain steadfast 
in their bid to expand nuclear capacities in the near term. Nonetheless, all 
states will face the impediments—to varying degrees—discussed in this 
paper. The implication is that the nuclear renaissance dream will remain 
unfulfilled. Growth of the industry, if any, will be modest; to the contrary, 
an overall decline over the next two to three decades cannot be ruled out.
Does Nuclear Energy Have a Future?    
Appendix 1
Nuclear Plants, capacity, and Relative Importance of Nuclear energy
Nuclear Electricity Generation
Reactors 
operational
Reactors under 
construction
Reactors 
on order or 
planned
billion 
kWh
% share
in total 
electricity
% 
share in 
primary 
energy
No. MWe No. MWe No. MWe
Argentina 6.7 6.2 2 2 935 1 692 1 740
Armenia 2.35 43.5 * 1 376 0 0 0 0
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000
Belgium 46 54 15 7 5728 0 0 0 0
Brazil 11.7 2.8 2 2 1901 0 0 1 1245
Bulgaria 13.7 32 22 2 1906 0 0 2 1900
Canada 88.2 14.7 7 18 12652 2 1500 3 3300
China 59.3 1.9 1 11 8587 7 6700 24 26320
Czech Republic 24.6 30.3 14 6 3472 0 0 0 0
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 22.5 29 20 4 2696 1 1600 0 0
France 420.1 77 39 59 63473 1 1630 0 0
Germany 133.2 26 12 17 20339 0 0 0 0
Hungary 13.9 37 12 4 1826 0 0 0 0
India 15.8 2.5 1 17 3779 6 2976 10 8560
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000
Iran 0 0 0 0 0 1 915 2 1900
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 267 27.5 13 55 47577 2 2285 11 14945
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 950
South Korea 136.6 35.3 15 20 17533 3 3000 5 6600
Lithuania 9.1 64.4 24 1 1185 0 0 0 0
Mexico 9.95 4.6 2 2 1310 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 4.0 4.1 1 1 485 0 0 0 0
Pakistan 2.3 2.34 1 2 400 1 300 2 600
Romania 7.1 13 3 2 1310 0 0 2 1310
Russia 148 16 5 31 21743 7 4920 10 11960
Slovakia 14.2 54 23 5 2064 2 840 0 0
Slovenia 5.4 42 * 1 696 0 0 0 0
South Africa 12.6 5.5 2 2 1842 0 0 1 165
Spain 52.7 17.4 9 8 7442 0 0 0 0
Sweden 64.3 46 33 10 9016 0 0 0 0
Switzerland 26.5 43 22 5 3220 0 0 0 0
Taiwan 39 19.3 8 6 4884 2 2600
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 87.2 48 15 15 13168 0 0 2 1900
United 
Kingdom 
57.5 15 8 19 11035 0 0 0 0
USA 806.6 19.4 8 104 99049 0 0 12 15000
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WORLD 2608 16 6 439 371,989 36 29,958 93 101,395
 * Data not available
Source: Compiled from “World Nuclear Power Reactors 2007-08 and Uranium Requirements,” World Nuclear 
Association, June 9, 2008, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors (accessed on June 9, 2008); Mycle Schneider, 
“The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2007,” Greens-EFA Group in the European Parliament, January 2008, 
http://www.greens-efa.org/cms/topics/dokbin/206/206749.pdf (accessed on June 14, 2008), p.17.
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